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IDEOLOGY, STATUS, AND THE DIFFERENTIAL SUCCESS OF 
DIRECT PARTIES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
REGINALD S. SHEEHAN University of North Texas 
WILLIAM MISHLER and DONALD R. SONGER University of South Carolina 
A substantial literature on lower federal courts and state courts suggests that the "haves" 
usually come out ahead in litigation because they possess superior resources for it and they 
reap advantages from their repeat player status. We investigate the success of 10 categories 
of litigants before the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts to determine whether the resources or 
experience of litigants has effects on Supreme Court outcomes paralleling those found in the courts 
below. While different categories of litigants are found to have very different rates of success, those 
differences do not consistently favor litigants with greater resources. A time series analysis of the 
success of different categories of litigants over the 36 years studied suggests that the changing 
ideological complexion of the Court has a greater impact on the success of litigants than differences 
among litigants in resources and experience. 
W e examine the impact of litigant status and 
the changing ideology of the U.S. Supreme 
Court on differences in the success rates of 
direct parties before the Court. Simply, we seek to 
explain why some categories of litigants win more 
frequently than others when appearing before the 
Court. Previous explanations have attributed differ- 
ential success rates in lower federal courts to, inter 
alia, disparities between litigants of different status in 
judicial experience and resources. We argue, how- 
ever, that differential success rates in Supreme Court 
decisions have more to do with the ideological com- 
position of the Court and the Court's receptivity to 
the different types of legal claims made by litigants of 
different status. 
Previous research indicates that the status of liti- 
gants before American courts has substantial influ- 
ence on judicial outcomes. Higher-status parties en- 
joy significant advantages in appellate courts and 
usually win. This has been demonstrated in the U.S. 
courts of appeals (Sheehan and Songer 1989) and, to 
a lesser degree, in state supreme courts (Wheeler et 
al. 1987). Curiously, the impact of litigant status on 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions has not been widely 
studied. 
Among other arguments frequently advanced to 
explain status differentials in litigant success rates are 
that higher-status litigants typically possess superior 
resources or greater litigation experience (or both). 
Galanter (1974), for example, cites the advantage that 
corporations and especially governments enjoy as 
"repeat players" in comparison to less-experienced 
single-shot litigants. Repeat players are presumably 
better able to "play for the rules" in the legal process. 
They can settle cases likely to be lost in the courts and 
appeal cases they have the best chance of winning- 
and thus maximize their success rates. 
In contrast, Sheehan and Songer (1989) stress the 
importance of resource differentials. They observe 
that even among single-shot litigants, the poor lose 
more frequently than wealthier individuals. Litiga- 
tion, of course, is expensive. Litigants with superior 
resources can arguably retain better legal counsel, 
undertake more extensive research, and otherwise 
invest more in case preparation. 
Another possibility, largely neglected in the litera- 
ture, is that status differences in success rates reflect 
not only the relative resources and experience of 
litigants but also the values, ideological preferences, 
and prejudices of the Court. Numerous studies 
(Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Cover 1989; Tate 
1981) document the effects that the political values of 
judges have on judicial decisions. Although no one to 
our knowledge has linked these values to litigant 
status, the connection is easily made in theory. Liti- 
gant status is related to the types of cases brought 
before' the Court and to the positions taken by the 
parties. Cases brought by minorities, the poor, and 
individuals against businesses or government fre- 
quently emphasize claims of individual rights and 
liberties. Thus, they are likely to appeal to liberal 
values and to enjoy greater success in courts with 
liberal majorities. Conversely, cases brought by bus- 
inesses against governments more typically seek reg- 
ulatory relief, appealing to conservative values. 
Our contention is that ideology is likely to be 
especially salient in cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. One reason is that litigant resource and expe- 
rience differentials are likely to diminish both in size 
and importance at higher levels of the judicial sys- 
tem. Litigants whose cases have survived the gaunt- 
let of the appeals process have proven they possess 
both considerable stamina and substantial resources. 
They also have acquired significant experience in the 
process. Assuming that status differences bear as 
much on decisions to grant certiorari as on decisions 
on merit, cases between litigants with the largest 
resource and experience differentials are unlikely to 
make it onto the Court's docket in the first place. 
Moreover, a case raising questions important enough 
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Net Advantage of Parties, 1953-88 (%) 
SUCCESS APPELLANT'S 
OVERALL RATE AS OPPONENTS NET 
TYPE OF SUCCESS RATE RESPONDENT SUCCESS RATE ADVANTAGEb 
PARTYa (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Poor individual 31.2 38.5 70.5 -32.0 
Minorities 55.6 44.3 34.9 9.4 
Individual 42.9 35.2 52.6 -17.4 
Unions 53.9 39.0 36.4 2.6 
Small business 42.7 29.2 46.9 -17.7 
Business 44.3 36.0 47.9 -11.9 
Corporations 38.6 29.3 48.6 -19.3 
Local govt 45.8 43.1 49.4 -6.3 
State govt 54.1 51.0 39.8 11.2 
Federal govt 67.3 59.1 23.2 35.9 
aln order of increasing status. 
'Col. 2 - Col. 3. 
to be granted certiorari is likely to have sufficient 
cachet to attract quality counsel willing to argue the 
case for the visibility and prestige the case might 
bring. Parties to such cases can also frequently sup- 
plement their resources with contributions from con- 
cerned individuals and (especially) interest groups. 
A second reason for hypothesizing that ideology 
will have a greater impact on the success of direct 
parties before the Supreme Court is our belief that 
ideological considerations are likely to be more 
sharply defined in cases reaching the Supreme Court. 
Again, because the Court controls its docket, it can 
select cases where peripheral issues are minimized 
and issues of principle predominate. Although there 
are exceptions, lower-level courts generally have less 
docket control and confront more cases where philo- 
sophical issues are obscured by other considerations. 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Data on the differential success rates of direct parties 
before the Supreme Court are available from the U.S. 
Supreme Court data base. The data base includes all 
cases decided with opinion by the Supreme Court 
between 1953 and 1988. Parties to these cases are 
identified by the labels given them in the Court's 
judgment or opinion. The detailed listing of parties in 
the data have been reduced to 10 categories: poor 
individuals, minority group individuals, other indi- 
viduals, unions, small businesses, corporations, 
other businesses, local governments, state govern- 
ments and the federal government.1 
Since the Supreme Court data base is constructed 
from the written opinions of the Court, it does not 
provide direct measures of the financial resources or 
previous litigation experiences of litigants. To circum- 
vent this problem we have adopted a strategy sug- 
gested by Wheeler and his colleagues (1987), ranking 
the 10 categories of litigants from strongest to weak- 
est based on estimates of their financial resources and 
likely experience as repeat players in litigation. Al- 
though using status as a proxy for resources and 
experience precludes an assessment of the indepen- 
dent effects of resources versus experience, it does 
permit assessment of their combined effects vis-a-vis 
ideology. 
To measure the changing ideological predisposi- 
tion of the Supreme Court across the 36 years encom- 
passed by this study, we use the ideology scores 
developed by Segal and Cover (1989) for individual 
justices.2 To create a composite measure of the ideol- 
ogy of the Court we sum Segal and Cover's individ- 
ual ideology scores across the nine justices who 
comprise the Court in any year. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the success rates of the 10 categories 
of litigants in cases decided by the Supreme Court 
during the years 1953-88. As expected, success rates 
vary widely across the several categories of litigants, 
ranging from 67% for the federal government to only 
31% for poor individuals. However, the overall suc- 
cess rates of litigants can be misleading. Because the 
Supreme Court is well known for its tendency to 
reverse decisions from below,3 litigants whose cases 
are accepted on appeal are more likely to win than 
those who appear as respondents. To compensate for 
this, Table 1 also reports the net advantage of each 
class of litigant. This measure controls for appellant 
status by focusing upon the success rate of litigants in 
cases in which they are respondents and subtracting 
the success rate of their opponents in cases in which 
the opponents are respondents.4 
If the resources and experience hypotheses are 
correct, we would expect the net advantage of the 10 
litigant groups to vary directly with their status 
rankings. In fact, the relationship is quite weak. The 
federal and state governments enjoy significant ad- 
vantages over other litigants, but so do minorities. 
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Individuals, especially the poor, are severely disad- 
vantaged before the Court; but so are corporations 
and small businesses. 
The overall net advantage of a category of litigants 
can be misleading, because the nature of the cases in 
which they typically are involved may bring them 
into conflict disproportionately with stronger or 
weaker opponents. To control for this possibility, we 
calculated the net advantage of each category of 
litigants against each of the other nine categories of 
litigants in our analysis. The results reinforce our 
observations both of the extreme variation in success 
rates among parties and of the limited impact of 
status differences (resources and experience) on suc- 
cess. 
Predictably, during the 36 years spanned by our 
analysis, the federal government enjoyed very large 
net advantages against all other parties. But the 
federal government is the only party that consistently 
dominated lower-status parties. In Table 2, the party 
assumed to have superior resources and experience 
had a net advantage in 20 of the 29 comparisons 
(69%) for which sufficient cases are available. How- 
ever, in 5 of those 20 cases, the advantage of the 
stronger party was negligible (i.e., five percentage 
points or less). Thus, the party presumed to be 
stronger enjoyed a clear-cut advantage in only 15 of 
29 comparisons-just about what would be expected 
by chance if we knew nothing about the relative 
status of competing parties. 
A different perspective on the resources argument 
is provided by examining the success rates of litigants 
over time. If resources and experience are determin- 
ing factors in Supreme Court decisions, we would 
expect success rates to be relatively stable over time, 
since the relative resources and judicial experience of 
parties probably have not changed much over the 
years. In contrast, the ideological composition of the 
Court has changed dramatically. Thus, if ideology is 
a determining factor we would expect the success 
rates of different status litigants to vary significantly. 
Table 3 displays the success rates for various com- 
binations of litigants5 across three periods corre- 
sponding roughly with the Warren Court (1953-70), 
the early Burger Court (1971-80) and the later Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts (1981-88).6 Consistent with the 
ideology hypothesis and contrary to the resource 
hypothesis, the relative success rates of parties before 
the Supreme Court vary considerably. Predictably, 
individual litigants have suffered most from the 
growing conservatism of the Court, their success 
rates falling in relation to all other categories of 
litigants.7 The pattern among other pairs of litigants 
is more complex. Businesses have fared better against 
the federal government but worse against state and 
local governments. State governments fared better 
against the federal government during the early 
Burger years but much worse during the Rehnquist 
years. Although the reason for this is not immedi- 
ately apparent, an explanation is offered in a subse- 
quent section. 
Net Advantage for Different Combinations of 
Parties, 1953-1988 
COMBINATIONS OF NET ADVANTAGE 
PARTIES BY % 
Poor individuals vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 52.4 
State government Poor individuals, 1.8 
Minorities vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 24.6 
State government Minorities, 12.2 
Local government Minorities, 24.7 
Businesses (incl. 
corp. & sm.) Minorities, 15.7 
Individuals vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 33.0 
State government State government, 17.6 
Local government Local government, 5.4 
Businesses Businesses, 2.1 
Corporations Individuals, 17.1 
Unions Unions, 10.6 
Unions vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 22.9 
Businesses Unions, 30.7 
Corporations Corporations, 16.7 
Small businesses vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 21.3 
State government State government, 23.1 
Businesses Businesses, 50.0 
Corporations Corporations, 5.7 
Businesses vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 43.8 
State government State government, .9 
Local government Local government, 5.7 
Corporations Businesses, 20.4 
Corporations vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 50.1 
State government State government, 28.6 
Local government Corporations, 32.1 
Local government vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 16.2 
State government Local government, 15.0 
State government vs. 
Federal government Federal government, 30.3 
MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
So far, examination of the resource and ideology 
hypotheses has been limited to comparisons of suc- 
cess rates across different combinations of litigants 
over time. Although illuminating broad patterns, 
these comparisons do not provide systematic esti- 
mates of the relative effects of either status or ideol- 
ogy. To obtain such estimates, we report logistic 
regressions in Table 4 for all Supreme Court decisions 
between 1953 and 1988 that involve some combina- 
tion of our four aggregate litigant groups (i.e., indi- 
viduals, businesses, state and local governments, and 
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Success of Party Combinations over Time, 
1953-88 (%) 
TYPE OF 
PARTY 1953-70 1971-80 1981-88 
Individual vs. 
Businessb 75.3 (174) 48.6 (138) 42.6 (129) 
State and local 65.6 (518) 40.5 (870) 32.8 (585) 
Federal 52.5 (503) 28.0 (414) 16.6 (259) 
Business vs. 
State and local 58.7 (179) 42.6 (209) 47.5 (139) 
Federal 25.2 (361) 27.6 (243) 31.5 (111) 
State and local 
vs. federal 37.1 (35) 46.8 (47) 22.6 (31) 
Note: Percentages are of cases won by first party listed. Number of cases 
in which the two parties opposed each other are in parentheses. 
aPoor individuals, minorities, and other individuals. 
"Small businesses, corporations and other businesses. 
the federal government). Logistic regression is used 
since the dependent variable for each case is coded 1 
if the litigant group won and 0 if it lost. Predictor 
variables in the four models include the status differ- 
ential of the litigants (which serves as a proxy for 
differential resources and litigant experience)8 and 
the aggregate ideological composition of the Court 
described previously. As a control variable, we also 
coded whether the litigant group in question was the 
appellant or respondent in the case. 
Confirming the well-established tendency of the 
Supreme Court to reverse decisions from below, the 
models in Table 4 clearly indicate that all four classes 
of litigants have greater probabilities of success when 
they are appellants. The relationship is statistically 
significant and strong in all of the models and holds 
irrespective of the ideological composition of the 
Court or the relative resources of the litigants. 
More important from our perspective, however, is 
the evidence of the relative effects of litigant re- 
sources and the ideology of the Court on the success 
of litigants. The evidence regarding the former is 
weak at best. In the business model and state and 
local government model, resource differentials ap- 
pear to contribute significantly to the outcome of the 
case, although the size of the effect is quite modest. 
Resources, however, are not significant predictors of 
decisions in cases involving individuals or the federal 
government. 
Further weakening the resource argument is the 
evidence that the effects of resources in the business 
model and state and local model stem almost entirely 
from the tendency of these parties to lose consistently 
to the federal government. In analyses in which cases 
involving the federal government are removed (not 
shown), resources cease to be statistically significant 
in the business model and are reduced to borderline 
significance in the state and local government model. 
In contrast to resources and experience, the ideol- 
ogy of the Court has had considerable impact on the 
success rates of litigants of different status. This is 
most clearly seen for individual litigants who have 
enjoyed much greater success before the Court dur- 
ing more liberal periods regardless of the resources of 
opposing litigants or of their status as appellant or 
respondent. 
Predictably, the ideology of the Court also has 
strong and significant effects on the success of state 
and local governments. Given that conservatism tra- 
ditionally accords priority to the claims of order and 
community over the rights of individuals, it is not 
surprising that the success of state and local govern- 
ments before the Court has been related inversely to 
the liberalism of the Court. 
As we have seen, the federal government wins the 
great majority of its cases against all comers regard- 
less of the relative resources of opposing parties or of 
the ideology of the Court. Nevertheless, the advan- 
tage enjoyed by the federal government in all situa- 
tions increases significantly as conservatives gain in 
strength on the Court, although it increases at only 
about half the rate that the advantage enjoyed by 
state and local governments does. 
Logit Estimates for Models of Party Success 
INDEPENDENT STATE AND 
VARIABLES INDIVIDUAL BUSINESS LOCAL FEDERAL 
Appellant .724* .903* .222* .897* 
(.079) (.104) (.087) (.102) 
Ideology .155* -.018 - .140* -.079* 
(.013) (.032) (.014) (.016) 
Resources -.094 .231 * .257* -.072 
(.062) (.043) (.058) (.083) 
Intercept -.843 -.718 -.228 .653 
Error reduction (%) 28 1 17 2 
Note: Success = 1. Numbers in parentheses equal standard error. 
p ' .01. 
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Time Series Models of the Effects of Ideology on Direct Party Success 
INDIVIDUAL VS. BUSINESS VS. STATE VS. 
BUSINESS STATE FEDERAL STATE FEDERAL FEDERAL 
Ideology 2.9 3.7 3.1 1.1 -1.3 2.8 
(1.31) (.973) (.837) (.611) (.393) (2.00) 
Noise modela MA(3) -.39 MA(3) -.29 MA(1) -.34 MA(3) .39 
(.156) (.145) (.094) (.162) 
MA(5) - .76 
(.091) 
RMSb 289 193 80 289 100 1,239 
ARMSC 14.1 18.5 35.4 18.8 25.9 2.3 
Qd 14.0 7.1 6.8 5.4 5.8 12.0 
Note: Models estimated with BMDP2T. Standard errors for parameter estimates in parentheses. Estimates more than twice as large as their standard errors 
are significant at the .05 level. 
'Moving Average specification for noise; the order of the Moving Average process is in parentheses. 
bRMS is the mean of the residual sum of squares for the model; it measures the model's "goodness-of-fit." Lower values indicate a better fit. 
cPercentage improvement (i.e. reduction) of the full model compared to the noise model only. 
dThe Ljung-Box Q tests of autocorrelation in the model's residuals; with 12 degrees of freedom, none of the Q estimates are statistically significant at the 
.05 level. 
A TIME SERIES PERSPECTIVE 
The evidence so far suggests that the ideological 
composition of the Supreme Court has a much 
greater impact on the success- of litigants than the 
resources the litigants possess. To better assess the 
aggregate effects of the changing ideological character 
of the Court on litigant success over the past three- 
and-a-half decades embraced by this analysis, we 
estimated a series of transfer function models using 
yearly success rates for each of the six pairs of 
litigants as dependent variables and the yearly index 
of the ideological composition of the Court as the 
independent variable. The transfer function models 
were estimated using standard Box-Jenkins methods 
(Box and Jenkins 1976). These enable us to measure 
the effects that ideology has had on the changing 
fortunes of the different categories of litigant over the 
36-year period, while controlling for the well-known 
problems associated with time series (Granger and 
Newbold 1986).9 
The transfer function models are reported in Table 
5.10 Since the ideology of each justice is measured on 
a scale of 1 (most liberal) to -1 (most conservative), the 
impact coefficients represent, in effect, the average 
increase in the success rate of one party over another 
resulting from the replacement of a relatively moder- 
ate member of the Court by a liberal member or a 
conservative member by a moderate one. For exam- 
ple, the coefficient for the impact of ideology on the 
success rate of individuals involved in litigation 
against state governments indicates that each unit- 
increase in the conservatism of the Court has reduced 
the success rate of individuals against states by 
slightly less that four percentage points. Although 
this impact may appear small, its effect over time can 
be substantial. Thus, from the high-water mark of 
liberalism on the Court in 1969 (ideology = 6.50) to the 
high tide of conservatism in 1988 (ideology = -2.02), 
the changing ideological composition of the Court 
was associated with a cumulative reduction in the 
success rate of individuals of almost 32 percentage 
points. 
The pattern of effects in these models is very 
similar to that reported in the individual analyses. 
New is the evidence of the cumulative magnitude of 
the effect of the changing ideology of the Court. The 
impact of ideology on the success rates of individuals 
is especially dramatic. The increasing conservatism in 
the Court since the Warren years has been associated 
with a reduction in the success rates of individuals 
against business by 25 percentage points, against 
states by 32 percentage points, and against the fed- 
eral government by 26 percentage points. As sug- 
gested in the analysis of individual cases, the con- 
servative tide has hurt businesses relative to state and 
local governments. However, the cumulative loss, 
although statistically significant, has been less than 
10 percentage points and has been compensated by 
an 11% increase in business successes against the 
federal government. 
The one model in which ideology is not statistically 
significant involves cases where the federal govern- 
ment opposes local or state governments. Contrary to 
our expectation that the increasing conservatism on 
the Court should benefit states in their struggles 
against the federal government, the direction of the 
impact coefficient indicates that states have won less 
frequently against the federal government as the 
Court has grown more conservative. Although not 
statistically significant, the size of the coefficient is 
substantial. One possible explanation for this is sim- 
ply that the number of cases involving the federal, 
state, and local governments as opposing litigants is 
relatively small. Since only slightly more than one 
hundred such cases have been decided over the 
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36-year-period, the success rates for states are highly 
volatile-especially in the early years, where the 
number of cases is especially small. Although this 
would account for the lack of statistical significance, it 
does not explain the large, contrary-to-theory impact 
coefficient. 
Another possibility is that the impact of ideology 
on the success of the federal government may de- 
pend on the ideological or partisan complexion of the 
federal government as much as that of the Court. The 
increasing conservatism of the Supreme Court has 
not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it is closely linked 
to the control of the executive branch of the federal 
government by conservative Republican administra- 
tions. Similarly, the increase in the liberalism of the 
Court in the 1960s was associated with the domina- 
tion of that decade by liberal Democratic administra- 
tions. Although the ideological complexion of indi- 
vidual state and local governments also changes, the 
large number of states and localities and the cross- 
cutting nature of change mean that the aggregate 
ideology of states and localities is much stabler over 
time than the ideology of the federal government. 
Given this pattern, it is possible that the ideological 
orientation of the federal government as a litigant 
before the Court is linked to the ideology or partisan 
orientation of the administration and, therefore, that 
the success of the federal government versus states is 
a product jointly of the ideology of the Court and of 
the federal government. In other words, we hypoth- 
esize that Democratic administrations will win more 
frequently against state and local governments as the 
liberalism of the Court increases but that Republican 
administrations will win more frequently against 
states and localities as the Court becomes more 
conservative. 
To test this possibility, we created a partisan- 
controlled measure of the success of state and local 
governments versus the federal government and es- 
timated a new transfer function model of the impact 
of ideology. The results are encouraging. The impact 
coefficient is strong, negative, and statistically signif- 
icant, indicating (as predicted) that the success of 
state and local governments against democratic ad- 
ministrations has declined as the Court has become 
more liberal and that state successes against Repub- 
lican administrations have declined as the Court has 
become more conservative. Although the reduction 
in the residual mean square produced by this model 
still is quite small (about 5%), it is double the reduc- 
tion achieved in the model without partisan controls. 
Finally, the pattern suggested in these data help to 
explain the observation in Table 3 that the success of 
state and local governments against the federal gov- 
ernment increased in the 1970s before declining in the 
1980s. During the early 1970s, Republican adminis- 
trations faced a still largely liberal Court where, as at 
the end of the decade, a Democratic administration 
faced a Court well on its way to becoming conserva- 
tive. The result was an ideological and partisan 
environment much more conducive to the interests of 
states and localities than the 1980s with its conserva- 
tive Court and Republican administration or the 
1960s with a liberal Court and Democratic adminis- 
trations. 
CONCLUSION 
Examination of the success of direct parties before the 
Supreme Court suggests that litigant resources and 
experience are considerably less important than in 
other appellate courts. The contrast between the 
Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of appeals is 
especially dramatic. Our analyses confirm the exist- 
ence of marked differences in the success rates of 
different categories of litigants before the Supreme 
Court. However, these differences are not related 
consistently to litigant status and vary substantially 
over time in ways suggesting that these differences 
have little to do with litigant resources or judicial 
experience and much to do with the changing ideo- 
logical composition of the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, what little evidence there is for the 
importance of resources and experience stems almost 
entirely from the observed dominance of the federal 
government against all other categories of litigants. 
Although the federal government's consistent suc- 
cess before the Court may be a consequence partly of 
its superior resources and experience as a repeat 
player, it also may be due to a variety of other, 
non-resource-related factors. Among the more im- 
portant of these, we speculate, is the long-standing 
substantial evidence doctrine, which encourages judicial 
deference to the federal government. In addition, our 
analyses provide evidence of what Dahl (1957) con- 
tends is a long-term political dynamic that tends to 
produce an ideological and partisan "alliance" be- 
tween members of the Court and presidential admin- 
istrations. This dynamic is most clearly evident in the 
increasingly conservative tenor of presidential Court 
appointments since 1980 and the Court's increasing 
support for the positions of conservative, Republican 
administrations during the same period. 
Of course, this research can be faulted in a variety 
of ways. For example, the use of litigants' status as a 
proxy for their resources and judicial experience 
introduces considerable measurement error into the 
analysis, as does the identification of the ideological 
interests of litigants based on their group identities. 
As we have noted, even poor defendants with inter- 
esting cases can attract skilled and experienced coun- 
sel and the financial support of powerful interest 
groups. Were more direct measures of litigant re- 
sources available, we might observe smaller resource 
differences between litigants and these small differ- 
ences might have greater effects on judicial out- 
comes.11 
Similarly, the diversity of ideological points of view 
within categories of litigants means that the effects of 
ideology are almost certainly underestimated. For 
example, the weak effect that ideology appears to 
have on the success of state and local governments 
versus the federal government may result because 
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state and local governments frequently press claims 
(e.g., that their environmental regulations not be 
overridden by more conservative federal standards) 
that are more liberal than our underlying assumption 
recognizes. 
Clearly, direct measures of litigant resources and 
ideological claims would be desirable. Unfortunately 
they are unavailable. Moreover, such data could not 
reasonably be obtained for a set of cases as extensive 
as the Supreme Court data base without a commit- 
ment of time and money equal, perhaps, to those 
already invested in that project. 
Nevertheless, although limited by the availability 
of data and the need to rely on proxies as measures 
for key concepts, we have provided the first system- 
atic analysis of the success rates of different categories 
of litigants appearing before the Supreme Court. In 
addition to demonstrating that success rates of liti- 
gants vary widely both across different types of 
litigants and over time, the analysis is at least sug- 
gestive as to the causes of these differences. Theory 
suggests-and our data support-the argument that 
litigant success before the Supreme Court depends 
substantially on the ideological composition of the 
Court but little, if at all, on the resources and prior 
judicial experience of the litigants. 
Notes 
We wish to thank Harold Spaeth for providing us with a 
preliminary copy of the U.S. Supreme Court data base, phase 
I. 
1. The category of poor individuals includes only parties 
who were clearly identified in the Court opinion as indigent. 
The individual category is obviously underinclusive, since it 
excludes individuals who are poor or members of groups 
usually considered to be protected minorities. It also excludes 
individuals who appear before the court in their professional 
capacity. Corporations are defined simply as very large busi- 
ness entities (e.g., airlines, railroads, banks, insurance com- 
panies, and oil companies). Small businesses are those which 
are more likely to have an individual owner-proprietor, 
including bookstores, realtors, restaurants, and theaters. The 
residual business category includes businesses in between the 
other two or whose sizes are ambiguous. A number of parties 
were not encompassed in any of these categories, including 
professional associations such as the American Medical Asso- 
ciation, churches, clubs, environmental groups, public inter- 
est organizations, and nonprofit groups. Since the resource 
levels or ideological orientations for most of these groups 
were ambiguous and the number of cases involving a number 
of these groups were quite small, we have excluded them 
from the analysis. 
2. The construction of these scores and their underlying 
assumptions and limitations are discussed in detail by Segal 
and Cover (1989). Simply, Segal and Cover assign each justice 
an ideological score between -1 (most conservative) and 1 (most 
liberal) based on content analyses of newspaper editorial 
commentaries of the justices' judicial philosophies at the time 
of their appointments to the Court. The measure was con- 
structed by, in essence, computing the percentage of para- 
graphs in the editorials of four newspapers that were coded 
liberal, conservative, or moderate by three separate coders: 
"Liberal statements include (but are not limited to) those 
ascribing support for the rights of defendants in criminal 
cases, women and minorities in equality cases, and the 
individual against the government in privacy and first amend- 
ment cases. Conservative statements are those with the 
opposite direction" (p. 559). The resulting construction re- 
flects the perceived ideology of new justices relative to pre- 
vailing values at the time. There were a few early justices who 
were not included in the Segal and Cover study. We esti- 
mated a score for these justices from the scale analyses 
reported in Rhode and Spaeth 1976 and Schubert 1965. Based 
on their relative scale scores, the justices were placed within 
the Segal and Cover scale. Most of these justices were 
involved in a small number of cases. The two who were 
involved in a large number of cases were Black and Douglas, 
both of whom it was very easy to classify as liberals. 
3. During the period under study, the Court's reversal rate 
was 67%. 
4. This measure reverses the logic advanced by Wheeler 
and his colleagues in measuring the effects of the opposite 
tendency of state courts to affirm cases from below (1987, 418). 
5. Because the number of cases for several categories of 
litigants becomes very small when disaggregated over time, 
we collapsed the 10 categories of litigants used in other 
analyses into four categories: individuals, businesses, state 
and local governments, and the federal government. Since 
unions do not fit naturally into any of these categories and 
were involved in relatively few cases, we dropped them from 
the remainder of the analysis. 
6. These periods were chosen primarily on the basis of 
political factors surrounding the appointment of new justices 
and the effect of these appointments on decisional trends. The 
1953-70 period corresponds with the appointment of Chief 
Justice Warren up to the appointment of Justice Blackmun. 
After the appointment of Blackmun in the early Burger Court, 
we see a significant change in the number of liberal decisions 
emanating from the Court. During the period 1981-88, we see 
an even greater drop in the number of liberal decisions 
delivered by the Court. These three periods allow us to obtain 
an indication of the effect of changes in the Court's composi- 
tion and ideological direction, on the success of different types 
of parties. 
7. It could be argued that the individual success rates are 
the result of the low success rates that criminal defendants 
generally have in appellate courts. To control for this possi- 
bility, the success rates of individuals were analyzed for 
criminal and noncriminal cases. Utilizing the same court 
periods, the success of individuals in criminal cases were 
58.1% (Court 1), 31.8% (Court 2), and 25.1% (Court 3). In civil 
cases, individual success rates were 61.1%, 41.7%, and 30.1%, 
respectively. Thus, we conclude that the success of individu- 
als has consistently declined across time in both criminal and 
noncriminal cases, and these data provide further evidence of 
the impact of ideological change on the fate of individual 
litigants. 
8. The status/resource variable assumes a status continuum, 
along which individuals = 1, business = 2, state and local 
governments = 3, and federal government = 4. Thus, when a case 
involves the federal government versus individuals as liti- 
gants, the status/resource differential is 3 or -3, depending on 
whether the model is explaining federal success or individual 
success. Similarly, when an individual opposes a business, 
the business would be coded as having a status/resources 
advantage of 1 if the individual was coded as having a 
disadvantage of -1. 
9. The use of Box-Jenkins procedures also makes it possi- 
ble to test for Granger causality in the relationship between 
the Court's ideology and litigant success rates (Freeman 1983; 
Granger 1969). Strictly speaking, Granger causality implies 
that lagged values of X explain variance in current values of Y 
that cannot be explained by past values of Y. In this case, it 
means that past values of the Court's ideology explain current 
litigant success that cannot be explained by past values of 
litigant success. (E.g., the introduction of lagged values for 
ideology result in a significant improvement in the residual 
mean square.) In fact, the best-fitting model specifications for 
all litigant groups is a model in which the effects of ideology 
on success rates are untagged. In every case, a model speci- 
fied with a lagged ideology effect of one year was also 
470 
American Political Science Review Vol. 86, No. 2 
significant, albeit somewhat smaller. Although the specifica- 
tion of unlagged ideology effects weakens the case for 
Granger causality in these relationships, the significant im- 
provement in the residual mean square registered in all of the 
models except the state-and-local-versus-federal-government 
one provides at least modest evidence of Granger causality. 
10. The impact coefficients in these models measure the 
expected change in the success rates of an opposing pair of 
litigants produced by a one-unit change in the aggregate 
ideology of the Court. Several of the models have significant 
moving average components in the error term. These indicate 
the existence of short stochastic cycles. The statistics at the 
bottom of the table provide summary measures of the models' 
performance and indicate that all of the models perform 
acceptably (again, except for the federal-versus-state-and- 
local model). Ideology produces reductions in the residual 
mean square in each model of between 15% and 35%, and the 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic indicates that the residuals in all models 
are appropriately free of autocorrelation. 
11. It should be noted, however, that our measure of 
litigant status/resources is the same used in previous studies 
where resources have been shown to be significantly related 
to judicial success rates (Sheehan and Songer 1989). Thus, the 
suggestion that resource differentials are smaller and less 
consistent among Supreme Court litigants and have smaller 
effects on litigant success is less a problem of measurement 
than confirmation of our initial hypothesis about the limited 
impact of resources on Supreme Court outcomes. 
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